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Bonaparte, the liberator
Luciano canfora
In the beginning of 1792, when the most dramatic changes of the Revolution had not yet been produced, and, however, the european powers considered the hypothesis of performing a military intervention in France in 
order to grant again to Louis XvI (who had been discredited before his people 
due to the escape from varennes) his full power, in Paris the “party of the war” 
was represented by the Girondists, particularly by Brissot and dumouriez. In 
april 20, with the so-called “Girondist cabinet”, the declaration of war was 
issued. as the emperor of austria had not responded to the French ultimatum, 
Maximilien Robespierre lined up, as of the first moment, against the choice of 
war. He was not, then, a member of the new parliament, the legislative assembly, 
but performed his battle in the club of the Jacobins, an important “pressure” 
group, but which was not yet a force of government. as of January the 2nd, 
Robespierre vigorously declared himself against the war, that is, especially against 
the Girondist pretense, or illusion, that “liberty” could be “exported”. “the most 
extravagant idea” said Robespierre, 
“that can be born in the mind of a political man is to believe that, for a people, 
it suffices to invade the territory of a foreign people at gunpoint to make them 
adopt their laws and their constitution. nobody loves the armed missionaries; the 
first advice that nature and prudence offer is to repel them as enemies.”
and further: “Wanting to grant freedom to other nations before having 
achieved it ourselves means to ensure, at the same time, our servitude and the 
servitude of the whole world.”
His speech shines due to its historical and political solidity. Robespierre 
(2000, t.vIII, p.81-2) reminds the Jacobins that the Revolution had been 
launched by the upper classes:
“the parliaments, the noblemen, the clergy, the wealthy people were the ones 
that drove the Revolution forward; the people appeared only afterwards. they 
changed their minds or wanted, at least, to stop the Revolution when they 
realized that the people could recover their sovereignty; but they were the ones 
that started it. Without their resistance and their mistaken calculations, the 
nation would still be under the domination of the despotism.”
and he continues:
“For that reason, in order to successfully ‘export’ liberty (that is, the Revolution) 
it would be required to count on the support from the upper classes in the 
 the resilience of the nation 
state to globalization 
rubens ricupero
the studies in the seminar that inspired the dossier “nation/nationalism” of this issue of estudos avançados are all dedicated to the analysis of european experiences, with the exception of the article about Israel. even 
that article was written by a european, as were the others.
the lack of variation in the nationality of the authors is a limitation given 
the universal scope of the theme chosen – the nation and nationalism – without 
adjectives. there are no works from other perspectives, from asia, africa, north 
or south america.
to remedy this problem was one of the motives that led the journal, upon 
adopting the theme, to expand the approach. this is fully justified, given that, 
in terms of nation and or nationalism, europe is an exception to the general rule 
because of its unique nature.
the europeans invented the nation-state and modern nationalism, 
together with the founders of american independence. In europe, however, the 
creation became a monster in the 20th century, turning itself against the creators 
and provoking critical rejection unparalleled in other regions or continents. the 
european union currently represents the only successful example (although still 
incomplete) – in an effort that has lasted more than half a century - to build a 
state structure that transcends the nation-state. the trend is due precisely to the 
traumatic experience of the europeans with the monstrous nationalism of the 
two world wars and to the desire to reverse this self-destructive process.
It is for this reason that it is advisable to broaden the focus of the analysis, 
to avoid a partial and incomplete approach. I will attempt to make a contribution 
in this direction, with two reservations. the first is that I will not detain myself on 
what professor Paulo Butti de Lima calls, in the “Foreword”, national “feelings”.
the second refers to the nomenclature, which is not always concerned, in 
the studies in the dossier, in precisely distinguishing the concept of nation as it 
relates to the “national state”. Frequently, when nation is spoken of, the reference 
is more to nation-state strictly speaking, as was clear in the “Foreword”, which 
mentions the “national historic processes of affirmation in the modern and 
contemporary world”. this affirmation is made through the organization of 
nations into national states, especially since the French Revolution. 
In this line, the approach which I intend to use is that from international 
relations theory, which emphasizes the role of the nation state as the principal 
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actor in the international system formed by similar units. the importance of this 
focus does not imply ignoring certain limitations, such as those raised by Giddens 
(1996, p.65-7).
the weakening of the national state by globalization has been widely 
declared in the literature. a good sample of this is found in Habermas (2001). 
Without denying the value of these arguments, I will seek to show that the 
national state has been capable of surprising resilience. 
therefore, to complement the narratives employed in the seminar, an 
empiric survey of the real experience of the nation state in the past decades 
perhaps would be useful. the lens used for the examination will open on a much 
broader field than the european or occidental plane, attempting to embrace a 
view as universal as possible of the trends in this issue, in a type of global political 
geography of the modern national state.  
The “Balkanization” of the planet
at the time in which I write (February 2008), one of the new crises of 
the international agenda is Kosovo’s proclamation of its right to form a state 
independent from serbia, which in fact it already is. two years earlier it was 
Montenegro’s turn. In the brief span of just over 10 years, the Yugoslavian 
peninsula gave rise to seven states where there had been just the single 
Yugoslavian Federation. a bit earlier, the disintegration of the soviet union had 
produced 15 states from only one.
 “Balkanization”, after becoming known as a worldwide phenomenon, 
has thus returned to the Balkans of its origin. some specialists in international 
relations sought this old expression to describe the true proliferation of states, 
which began in the 20th century and has continued until today. a century earlier, 
there had been a notable contraction in the number of sovereign units for two 
reasons: on one hand, the unifications of Germany and Italy; and on the other, 
the expansion of european imperialism in africa and asia, eliminating countless 
previously autonomous entities. the exception to the reduction of states had been 
the independence of Latin america, in particular the fragmentation of spanish 
america.
Going back a bit farther, the europe of the 17th and 18th centuries had 
nearly 500 units corresponding to the genre that preceded the national state, 
and which had a territorial nature, as consecrated by the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648). after the French Revolution and napoleonic wars, approximately 30 
european states were left in the Congress of vienna, of which few were genuine 
national states such as France or england. some had the nature of multinational 
states linked by common dynastic ties.
these increasingly anachronous empires – the turkish-ottoman, the 
Czarist, the austro-Hungarian – would disappear with the First World War, 
giving birth to numerous states in Central, eastern, Balkan europe and in the 
Middle east that were relatively more homogeneous from the point of view of 
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their national constitutions. since then, the trend towards the proliferation of 
states, through the great wave of decolonization in asia, the Caribbean and 
africa, has not ceased to rise. In africa alone, the number of independent states 
rose from just two or three (egypt, the south african union and ethiopia before 
the Italian occupation) to more than 50. 
It would be risky to affirm that this proliferation is in the process of 
stabilizing or turning back. Russia’s difficulties with Chechnya and the Caucasus 
in general (despite the fragmentation of the ussR, the Russian Federation still 
encompasses peoples of nearly 100 different languages and has elements of the 
multicultural empires of the past), the separatist movements in Georgia and 
azerbaijan and  the Basque problem indicate that the desire to create new states 
is still attractive. 
The persistence of the form of the National State
It is also important to note how the multiplication of the nation-state is a 
trend that tends to last, once established. even the failed states, characterized by 
a true “regression of the state” agonize but do not disappear. the most extreme 
imaginable situation of state failure, that of somalia, which has been without 
a central government for more than a decade and is divided by feudal lords, 
maintains the appearance, if not the reality, of a national state.
the preference for the more or less homogenous state form, in terms of 
national constitution, invariably condemned to failure all the attempts to join 
various small and weak entities and organize them in federations, in order to better 
prepare them for independence. the West Indies Federation in the antilles, the 
Malaysian Federation of singapore and Malaysia and the various attempts made by 
english and French colonizers in West, Central and east africa were all fleeting. 
In the same way, the jurisdiction of the great British empire in India 
became fragmented first into India, Burma and Pakistan, and then the latter gave 
origin to Bangladesh after a brief and bloody war. In the 1990’s, eritrea separated 
from ethiopia, to which it had been tied by the inheritance of the colonial 
conquest. 
the rare examples of fusion – Germany and vietnam – have occurred only 
when the people of a single ethnicity and language had been divided for political-
ideological reasons linked to the Cold War. 
a rarer example is that of tanzania, which was born from the union of 
tanganyika, of mixed British-German colonization, with Zanzibar. But the 
truth is that everything is exceptional in tanzania, beginning with the privilege 
of having as its founding father the noble figure of Julius nyerere, who insisted 
on being called “Mwalimu”, the title given to an elementary school teacher. In 
addition to having formed one of the few african countries that did not fall into 
the scourge of tribalism, nyerere was the only leader who took the initiative to 
limit his own mandate, removing himself from power while still in full glory.
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Whenever there is domination of one nation by another, the difficulty 
of returning to the past unity is nearly insurmountable. the union of sweden 
and norway dissolved in 1905. sweden is now part of the european union, but 
norway did not return to indirectly join sweden, even with the buffering shield 
of the european union. It is suggestive that norway is, along with switzerland, 
the only european country whose population has no interest in adhering to 
Brussels.
switzerland’s attitude is related to its pioneering role in the construction 
of a multicultural, multi-linguistic state, at first under the form of a 
confederation, as its name indicates, and then, evolving into a federation. Many 
europeans dream that the european union will evolve similarly to the Helvetic 
Confederation, if on a larger scale. It is understandable that, the very success 
of their own union, makes the swiss hesitate to submit their model, based on a 
patriotism born from the quality of their institutions, to the tension resulting 
from adhesion to a european system that was not able to free itself from the 
blemish of having a “democratic deficit”.
The variety and plasticity of the National State
the proliferation of states has now produced close to 200 state units 
of greater or lesser autonomy, of which 192 are part of the united nations 
(un), making it the first international organization of nearly planetary scope. 
only important political factors impede this scope from becoming total, by 
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Julius Kambarage nyerere (1922-1999).
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impeding the entrance of states such as taiwan, which have all the other needed 
requirements.
to indicate how the creation of the national states accelerated, it is useful 
to remember that of the two hundred centers capable of relatively autonomous 
decisions, no fewer than 150 originated in the 20th century. In order to qualify 
the number of states by their true population size, it is worth noting that three 
quarters of the world population is concentrated in only 25 states, each one with 
a population of 50 million inhabitants or more.
this qualification points to another factor, that of the fantastic diversity 
of sizes, resources, power and characteristics of the national states. at one 
extreme is found those denominated by George Kennan (1993, p.143-6) as 
“monster countries”. there are two conditions necessary to qualify as a monster: 
a continental territory combined with a huge population, of some two hundred 
million people. 
It is not enough to have a large territory and a small population - as do 
australia or Canada - or a sizeable population and a small territory - such as 
Japan. the example of Japan, a country with a large population, but one that is 
extraordinarily homogenous, highlights another factor important to Kennan: 
heterogeneity. this would result from the combination of many peoples within 
an immense space in which they are spread out. Heterogeneity is taken in a literal 
sense: “composed of elements or parts of a different nature”. 
the criteria point to the following members of the select club: the 
united states, China, India the former ussR and Brazil. all are heterogeneous, 
either because of the evident ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity (such as in 
India and Russia and China to a lesser degree) or because of the sharp regional 
contrasts. 
the term select is not used as a value judgment. For Kennan, size is seen 
more as a defect than a quality. Returning to Rousseau and to the traditional 
swiss argument that democracy only functions within small communities where 
everyone knows each other, he questions the effect of size on the quality of 
democracy. note the pessimism of this observation: there is a real question as to 
whether “bigness” in a body politic is not an evil in itself, quite aside from the 
policies pursued in its name” (ibid, p.143). 
In opposition to the monsters are found the micro-states, the miniature 
countries that survive by issuing postage stamps, by renting their name on 
the internet (an advantage that arose with globalization) or from the facilities 
that they offer as tax havens. Between the two poles stretches an extensive 
intermediary range of states of a nearly countless variety of sizes – miniscule, 
small and medium. there is also a notable variety of geographic situations – small 
islands, landlocked enclaves – Medieval principates, city-states and formerly great 
powers reduced to average countries.
the only thing that such diverse entities have in common is the option 
for the modality of the national state born at the end of the 18th century. 
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the variety of situations served by the national state says much in favor of 
the plasticity and usefulness of this type of organization. the national state 
adapted both to the needs of mastodons, such as China and Russia, as well as 
to the insignificant islands of the Pacific, such as vanuatu and tuvalu. even the 
Catholic Church never let go of the guarantee of relative autonomy that the 
state of the vatican confers to it. the virtual unanimity of choice for this kind 
of organization recommends caution in prophecies that the national state is 
suffering a terminal crisis and will be widely discarded for something better.
The challenges of the National State in the 21st century
to recognize the enviable historic success of the invention of the national 
state does not mean ignoring that it is subject to tensions and challenges that, 
at least in europe, can eventually lead to its substitution by a post-national 
configuration. It is risky to generalize about these tensions, because only some 
of them are, in fact, unprecedented, and related to the advance of globalization. 
even these, although they are felt throughout the world, do not affect all states 
with equal intensity. 
other tensions, such as those created by the global actions - to a 
certain point out of the control of the states, of non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations, religions, parties, political movements, terrorists and 
international organized crime networks - are not exactly new, although they have 
multiplied and taken on a scope unknown in the past.
there are other important factors found in specific circumstances of 
space and time. In relation to european unification, these include motives such 
as the desire to avoid the repetition of world wars, to make a common front 
against soviet pressure during the Cold War, to create a critical mass capable of 
maintaining for europe a status comparable to that of the united states, or of the 
rising asian giants etc.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that while in the european 
context, reasons of this type may lead to a possible overcoming of the nation 
state, in other continents differences of historic time did not allow them to even 
reach the coveted minimum level of a functional nation state yet. thus, the 
thesis of the decline of the nation state does not have the same attractiveness 
for those who are still trying to integrate the indigenous Bolivian population 
in a national state structure, overcome tribal divisions by means of national 
governments in africa, or obtain recognition as a state for Palestine. 
the recent literature tends to give greater importance to the challenges 
that rise from globalization for certain traditional functions of the nation 
state. the power of state government is eroded not so much by means of 
the unprecedented intensification of cross-border economic and commercial 
transactions, which remain under government supervision. the phenomenon 
occurs, above all, from the transborder contacts or transactions that take place 
above or below borders, as if borders had become irrelevant. 
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this is what is taking place with the stunning explosion of 
communications and contact over the Internet and by electronic wave lengths, 
leading to the uniformization of cultural and political standards. or by means 
of electronic commerce, for example in the buying and selling of non-tangible 
goods, ordered and downloaded by computer, paid for in tax havens that 
completely escape the vigilance of national authorities. this is not to mention 
the explosive increase, with no ties to the real economy, of financial and currency 
operations over the Internet. 
to these modalities of transactions are added the multiform activity of 
transnational companies operating in dozens of countries, capable of moving in 
search of lower operating costs, doted with resources greater than those of most 
national economies. the sum of these factors will lead, throughout the world, to 
the exacerbation of ruthless competition, with dangers for the conquests of and 
guarantees provided by the Welfare state. 
Habermas (2001, p.84) is one of the authors who calls attention to 
the fact that “since the late 1970’s [...] this form of institutionalization, based 
on the national state, is found under increasing pressure from globalization”. 
according to Habermas, the expression “globalization” evokes “in counterpoint 
to the territorial bond of the national state, the image of rivers overflowing that 
undermine border controls and which can lead to the destruction of the national 
structure” (ibid, p.85-6). 
He systematically reviews how globalization affects: “a) legal security and 
the effectiveness of the administrative state; b) the sovereignty of the territorial 
state; c)collective identity; and d) the democratic legitimacy of the national state “ 
(ibidem, p.87-102).
Globalized competition makes it increasingly impossible to defend the 
european social and democratic state exclusively in the realm of the nation state. 
Given this difficulty, Habermas’ response favors the construction of a europe 
with a post-national configuration, founded on a “constitutional patriotism” to a 
Charter approved on the basis of broad legitimacy.
He approvingly cites Carl offe: “a strengthening of european institutions 
in terms of their capacity to govern cannot be considered without the strong 
increase of their democratic base of legitimacy” (apud Habermas, 2001, p.125). 
While in the “Introduction”, he refines this argument by declaring: 
I see a normatively satisfactory alternative [...] only in the federalist improvement 
of a european union capable of acting in terms of social and economic policy, 
which could then turn its eye to the future of a (global) cosmopolitan order, 
which is sensitive to differences and socially balanced. (ibid, p.2) 
this is not the place to discuss the obstacles that have been found, in 
practice, both to the approval of a european constitution by a broad legitimizing 
base, as well as to the determination and effectiveness of the european union to 
avoid the dismantling of the social state. nevertheless, Habermas’ position is that 
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which best synthesizes the ideal of a post-national configuration as the sole hope 
for deterring the impetus of dehumanizing globalization. 
The vicissitudes of globalization 
 a word of caution is in order. Warnings about the dangers of 
globalization were in vogue at a time in which it appeared as a devastating 
wave that would wash away everything. In the 1990’s, particularly in the 
first half of the decade, this was the predominant impression. the impacts of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of real socialism and the disintegration of 
the soviet union were still fresh. the general convergence towards a market 
economy and representative democracy inspired premature announcements 
such as that of the “end of History”. 
the highest tide was in the mid 1990’s when the World trade 
organization (Wto) was founded in 1994, a bit before the beginning of the 
monetary and financial crises in Mexico-argentina (1994-1995), asia (1997) 
and Russia and Brazil (1998). since then, various factors have contributed 
to alter that perception: the contagiousness of the crises, the breaking of the 
“electronic- dot.com bubble” (2000-2001), the antiglobalization movement 
and the impasse in the three important negotiations that would complete the 
legal-institutional framework of a globalized economy. 
these three processes sought to complete the circle of planetary 
economic unification in three fundamental economic sectors: finance (through 
the full opening of the capital account of the balance of payments by the 
IMF); investments (through the frustrated Multilateral Investment accord 
negotiations in the oeCd); and commerce (through the abolition of all the 
remaining restrictions to commerce by the Wto). 
of these three, the first two were removed from the agenda (except for 
that of investments in bilateral and regional accords) and the latter was taken 
up again by the Wto, under the diluted form of the doha Round.
the most serious blow, however, came from an unexpected direction, 
from the periphery of the system - afghanistan. the terrorist attack of 
sept. 11, 2001 introduced a new phase in international relations, bringing 
back obsessive concerns with security. the immediate consequence was the 
affirmation of the state over the market, the dominance of the political and 
military realms over the economic and the logic of reinforcement and not 
abolition of border controls.
a revealing symptom of the change is that, in contrast with former 
President Clinton, President George W. Bush practically banned the word 
globalization from his discourse. this change in discourse  is natural, 
because a government of a sharply nationalist and unilateral bent such as 
his has weak affinity with the internationalism of globalization. the current 
problems – interminable wars in Iraq and afghanistan and the economic 
crisis of disturbing proportions at the heart of the economic center of the 
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globalized world – impede the return of conditions propitious to a new peak 
of globalization.
Ambiguities of globalization
Globalization was at one time understood as the anglo-saxon variety 
disseminated by the Clinton and Blair governments, which were the principal 
sources of pressure to liberalize norms and regimes in global negotiations or 
within the european union. 
today, a variation of globalization with a Chinese, Indian, asian, 
arab or Brazilian accent is affirmed with increasing clarity. the first impact 
of this transformation in the developed countries appears in their appetite 
for commercial opening, which is weakened by the dominant fears in world 
commerce. simply speaking these include: fear of Chinese industry, fear of the 
off-shore services of India and fear of Brazilian agriculture. 
In addition to competitive products, the emerging countries also export 
investments, whether directly by the action of their internationalized companies 
or by the sovereign funds made possible by the accumulation of reserves. 
Reactions to this have been expressed in sensitive sectors, such as investors from 
dubai who were forced to give up attempts to purchase controlling interests in a 
u.s. port company and a Chinese state oil company that had to step back from 
the purchase of a u.s. refinery.
More recently, concern is beginning to be shown for support provided 
by sovereign funds from China, singapore and arab countries to american 
investment banks weakened by losses in the mortgage market, through the 
purchase of part of the capital of these firms. Incipient, the concern could grow if 
the operations are repeated or come to involve a transfer of control.
It is possible that, as in Great Britain some time ago, the reaction is 
nothing more than an initial shock, and there will be no greater developments in 
the future. But only time will tell how the new trend will affect the pressure for 
the liberalization of norms.
In any case, the current changes serve to qualify the categorical terms with 
which it was affirmed that the dismantling of state controls was an irresistible 
demand linked to the nature of globalization. It is now seen that, at least in part, this 
apparent determinism is nothing more than an ideological pretense for the action of 
governments of powerful nation states such as the united states and england. 
this said, it cannot be denied that the reduction of controls is partially 
the result of the profound economic or technological forces that are more or 
less independent of the will of governments. this is the case of the propulsive 
trends of globalization: the internationalization of the production process, 
its fragmentation by locations geographically distant from one another due 
to economies of scale, the transnationalization of companies that operate 
the process and create the distribution networks and advances in electronics, 
telecommunications and transport that made it possible. 
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these forces continue active and operating. What has changed was the 
political, ideological context of security within which they move. In sum, it is 
not an exaggeration to maintain that globalization did not suffer a setback, but 
lost for now what the americans call momentum, that is, the impetus and the 
accelerated rhythm exhibited 12 or 15 years ago.
Other ambiguities
to understand the situation faced by the national state, it is appropriate 
to consider two observations: 1. not everything that weakens the power of the 
national state should be ascribed to the effect of globalization, other forces are 
in action in the domain of politics and security; 2. the effects of these forces are 
ambivalent and do not necessarily weaken the capacities and possibilities of the 
nation-state.
In other words, as Giddens (1996, p.67) said: “the loss of autonomy on 
the part of some states or groups of states has often gone along  with an increase 
in that of others, as a result of alliances, wars or political and economic changes of 
various sorts”.
the most important of these changes has been the gradual emergence, since 
World War II, of a collective security system incarnated in the most universal of all 
the international organizations of history, the united nations. notwithstanding its 
notorious deficiencies – for example, the Iraqi invasion, without security Council 
support, it cannot be denied that the countries without military power are better 
protected than at any time  in the past against aggressions, invasions or annexations. 
the universal system is considerably reinforced by regional alliances, as is the case of 
the best known of them, the national atlantic organization (nato). 
the combination of new opportunities created by globalization with the 
added sense of security explains the reappearance on the world scene of City states 
such as singapore and Hong Kong, the latter even after it had been returned to 
China without losing some of its previous characteristics. Certain petroleum states 
of the Gulf, such as the united arab emirates and Qatar, are not very far from this 
standard: without agriculture and with scanty or desert territory, they increasingly 
specialize in the creation of sophisticated and efficient advanced centers for 
providing services or communication nodes, a model of which singapore and dubai 
are well-known examples. 
It would be difficult to imagine in our days a repetition of the brazenness 
with which napoleon suppressed the Most serene Republic of venice, or with 
which he or the French revolutionary forces eliminated other venerable relics like 
the Republic of Genoa and Geneva. and, nevertheless, what defends the unarmed 
units against powerful predators if not the un system, international law and the 
self-contention of the powerful? 
In the ancient european territorial regime, in which the great powers used 
to enlarge themselves by means of conquering territory, very rich entities such as 
Luxembourg (with four hundred thousand inhabitants) or norway (with four 
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million inhabitants) would only escape annexation if the avarice of the strong 
would balance each other and mutually cancel themselves. 
the phrase “territory is power”, is attributed to the Baron of Rio Branco. 
territory is still perhaps one of the bases of power. It is no longer evident, 
however, that some of the consequences associated to power and to size, especially 
the maximization of well-being, of the “happiness” of citizens, sought by the 
revolutionaries of american independence, or by saint-Just, derive or depend on 
territory or on strength. this confirms Kennan` s skepticism towards the monster-
countries. 
all the classificatory indexes of human development , per capita income, 
longevity, absence of corruption and criminality, place in the first 10 positions small 
countries such as Finland, norway, denmark, sweden, switzerland, Luxemburg, 
new Zealand, singapore and Iceland. they rank much higher not only than the 
gigantic united states, but even than the intermediary sized Germany, united 
Kingdom and France.
Could it be said that globalization is more of a threat than an opportunity 
for singapore or dubai? or that norway and Luxembourg, invaded by Hitler, and 
Finland, attacked by stalin, were more secure in the relatively recent past, let’s say in 
1939 or 1940? 
What these examples demonstrate is that the security of citizens, their 
prosperity or well-being, once much better guaranteed by the power of the state, 
can now be maintained by smaller structures, which are in thesis weaker, as long as 
international conditions are present that complement and reinforce them, such as 
those dominant since the end of World War II. 
Consider the secession of the slovacks of Checkoslavakia, in order to 
adhere separately to the european union. In the 1920’s or 1930’s, secession 
would have been seen as an unacceptable source of weakening and resisted 
by force. this time, it took place peacefully, given that the security of each of 
the two peoples depends on nato and, therefore, in the final instance, on 
the united states, given also that prosperity was no longer that of the variety 
promised by the restricted domestic market, but would come through adhesion to 
the much more seductive european market.
the separation of slovenia, and later of Montenegro, obeyed the same logic: 
the certainty that without the weight of the serbs it would be easier for these two 
old members of the former Yugoslavia to be admitted to the european union 
and nato. In each of these cases, a bi or multinational state was exchanged for 
incomparably more attractive structures such as the european union – in terms of 
economic potential and political prestige - and nato for security needs. 
Conclusions 
two organizational complexes, which originated from european history 
and with few parallels in earlier periods or cultural distinct situations, had special 
meaning in the development of modernity: the nation state and systematic 
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capitalist production. after this affirmation, Giddens (1996, p.174) observed: “If 
, in close conjunction with one another, they have since swept across the world, 
this is above all because of the power they have generated”. 
the observation highlights power, the central reality of the international 
system. Central does not mean to say exclusive. Like any other type of 
social organization, the international system is characterized by situations of 
collaboration and conflict, perceptions of coincidence or of conflict of the 
interests of the actors. 
By allowing an incomparable concentration of power, through the 
strengthening of administrative and fiscal capacity, territorial control and other 
elements, the nation state became the modality of organization most apt to 
promote cooperation and arbitrate conflicts.
From this point of view, Giddens is mistaken to place the nation state and 
capitalist production on equal planes, given that the second depends much more 
on the first, than vice-versa. this is being clearly seen in the currently expanding 
american economic crisis. Markets and companies, supposedly self-regulating, are 
imploring to be rescued by central banks and the fiscal action of states. 
under conditions of normality, Habermas’ statements about “impotence 
due to globalization” appear plausible, or his reference to the decreased capacity 
of control (of the state) in macroeconomic terms. at times such as the present, 
they do not sound very convincing.
It could be that the further negative development of the crisis make the 
medicine of the state ineffective and require a long and painful cure. If this 
occurs, it would be from the specific gravity of the macro-imbalances that have 
been accumulating for some time in the u.s. economy and not because of some 
debility of the state caused by globalization.
the ideological argument that the economic sphere is autonomous from 
other realms was a belief that spread over the last two or three decades and, at 
times, it appeared that the economic order even had dominance over the political 
sphere. It was not perceived that trends such as financial liberalization and the 
opening of markets to international operators were less the consequence of 
the nature of things (in this case, of globalization) than of policies tenaciously 
followed by the u.s. treasury. In other words, they were political options, 
positions of financial markets that coincided with the interests of the most 
influential power in international negotiations; one more proof, in the final 
analysis, of the power of the nation state. 
this is so true that, a contrario sensu, the two most spectacular success 
stories of economic growth, China and India, constitute examples of development 
led by strong nation states highly resistant to financial liberalization or the 
impositions of transnational companies. It was not by chance that it was these 
two economies that suffered less from the asian crises of 1997. 
the reality of our times is, thus, a world still formed by national states 
and characterized by power as its central dimension. In a system defined in this 
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way, the concept that Robert Gilpin (1987) denominated “hegemonic stability” 
remains valid, in such a way that the description that I sketched of the system, 
more than 12 years ago, appears to me as still appropriate.
In that text, I said that the difficulty of fitting the current configuration of 
forces into one of the theoretical prototypes of the past was caused by the form by 
which equilibrium was established. In the traditional conception, equilibrium is 
derived from the component countries themselves and their specific weight. the 
number of principal actors – one two or multiple – is what would determine if the 
distribution would be uni-, bi- or multipolar. It was supposed that each one of the 
principal actors was among the most influential actors in each one of the scenarios 
where power is affirmed: military, economic-financial, political, technological etc. 
today, a variety of actors compose the various domains and they are by no 
means the same in all the different areas. there are those which stand out in the 
economic and technological plane, Japan for example, but may not do so on the 
strategic-military plane. the final balance is produced, therefore, by means of a 
more complex interplay in which the actors are counterbalanced by competition 
through different mediums (heightened financial dependence, in certain cases 
counterbalancing a superiority in strategic arms). 
and I concluded: “ In this game, the unmatched advantage of the united 
states is that it is the only actor  and the largest of them all that plays a decisive 
role, on all the boards of power : military strategic, political, economic-financial, 
technological” (Ricupero, 1995, p.118-9), without forgetting the plane of culture 
and communications, where symbols, images, ideas are created.
this predominance does not establish an absolute unipolarity, which in 
ancient times was called universal monarchy - like that of the Roman empire, 
which did not recognize equals, only vassals or enemies. at the time when Gilpin 
was speaking of “hegemonic stability”, the united states was seen as a successor 
of victorian Great Britain, the power that actively promoted the establishment of 
a liberal political and economic order, as in the Roosevelt era, by recreating the 
foundations of international order in the post war period.  
What now draws our attention is that Washington has lost the ability to 
supply the moral and cultural leadership to build this always difficult multilateral 
consensus. this incapacity is due to the unilateralism of its action (the invasion 
of Iraq is one example) and the loss of legitimacy in terms of values because 
of atrocities such as those practiced at Guantanamo Bay and torture, direct or 
through third parties. 
It maintains, however, very extensive power to obstruct the nearly 
unanimous consensus of the others in many areas. the obstruction extends 
from its position against the Maritime Bottom regime to the new generations of 
human, social, economic and cultural rights. It applies from undermining the 
International Criminal Court and to the opposition against the treaty banning 
anti-Personnel Mines, culminating in the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
reluctance to negotiate a new international climate change regime. It is suggestive 
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that, in all these issues, the u.s. justifies its rejection on grounds of national and 
sovereign interest. the paradox of the situation is that the country that originally 
invented globalization and remains its principal beneficiary is also that which 
most affirms its own nationalism.
Many of these unilateral decisions stem from the growing drift of u.s. 
society towards conservative or right-wing positions, which have little influence 
on the predominant sentiment even in the rest of the Western world. this 
contrast can be perceived not only in the reduction of the international agenda 
to issues such as terrorism, the non-proliferation of arms and the Middle east, 
but also in the insistence on keeping the death penalty, extreme attitudes towards 
family and sexual morals, the role of religion in society, etc.
as long as this panorama is not changed through social evolution and or 
elections, chances are remote of an improvement in global governance by means 
of reform of the u.n. institutions, the IMF, World Bank and others, in the 
direction of greater democratization. 
the country with the greatest chance of reaching superpower status in the 
foreseeable future, China, has given nearly exclusive priority to its objectives of 
commercial-economic ascension and national strategic interests (taiwan, tibet). 
In issues of vital importance for the planet such as global warming, it behaves 
with the same sacro egoísmo as the united states.
In this context of traditional nationalisms, the european union appears 
to present a unique shape because of its post-national structure and the relatively 
more enlightened quality of its international leadership (in climate change for 
instance). Its structure is different from that of the old confederations, which 
began by delegating defense and diplomacy to a central power, exactly the 
sectors still most controlled by the national states in the european union. 
the european integration has started in the most specifically domestic sectors: 
agricultural policy, the common market, competitive rules, the european Court, 
common currency and the Parliament. 
Instead of copying models of the past, the europeans were able to create 
something new in terms of a post-national organization, as they did when they 
invented the national state. european integration goes to the depths of the 
issues and is based on values. a candidate for membership has to undergo a long 
process in which it must recreate itself by adapting its laws and institutions to the 
consolidated patrimony, adopting the minimum european standards of human 
rights, ecology and democratic rights. 
as a complement, the convergence of the new and poorer members toward 
the average income in the community is assisted by large financial transfers 
that have been capable of operating miracles such as those seen in spain and 
Ireland. the contrast with the free trade agreements signed by Washington is 
notable. these are restricted to the supposed potential of trade to bring about the 
convergence of income levels. 
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the difference stems from the nature of the process itself, which in 
the european case, sees the candidates as inheritors of the same history and 
civilization and as future co-citizens with equal rights. this type of financial 
assistance, rejected by the americans in their accords, is a mechanism of intra-
regional solidarity, until now a symbol of cohesion exclusive to nation states. It 
is this which allows the european union to transfer to the post-national level this 
attribute of the national state, as the “highest social league known until today 
able to make acceptable the sacrifice of redistribution” (offe apud Habermas, 
2001, p.129).
the learning of solidarity by citizens, expanded in the european 
dimension, is in keeping with europe’s historical experience. according to 
Habermas, this experience, even as a consequence of the lessons learned from 
the frequent conflicts and disasters of the past, contributed to overcoming the 
particular and narrow perspectives, the gradual control of traditional animosities, 
tolerance and the institutionalization of disputes. 
Its net result marked the “normative self-understanding of european 
modernity with an egalitarian universalism, which could facilitate [...] the 
transition [...] to a post-national democracy” (Habermas, 2001, p.130-1).
the skeptical reader would see this as a magnificent “creative myth”. 
as long as some qualifications are raised – including the extremely negative 
european reaction to Islamic and african immigrants, and to those from 
outside the community in general – it would not be an exaggeration to say 
that the myth has a sufficient tie to reality to make the european model more 
attractive than others. the european union’s more enlightened position in many 
international questions, beginning with global warming, justifies affirming that 
this position helps build “a socially balanced cosmopolitan order that is sensitive 
to differences”.  
Perhaps it is fitting, in conclusion, to evoke an image that can serve as a 
symbol of the differences. In early 2008, tv showed how a concrete wall was 
being raised in the american West to separate these lands (once Mexican) from 
Mexico - despite the fact that Mexico is a partner of the united states in a free 
trade agreement for nearly 15 years. at the same time, beyond the atlantic, 
border posts that separated Western europe from its recent members ranging 
from the elba to the Russian border were in the process of being removed. this 
opening, or better said, abolition of borders was the final coup to definitively 
dismantle the barrier that Churchill one day compared to an Iron Curtain that 
fell, inexorably, from sttetin to trieste, from the Baltic to the adriatic.
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AbstrAct - notwithstanding recent studies about the alleged weakening of some basic 
functions of nation-states on account of globalization, national states have been showing 
remarkable resiliency, that is, flexibility and adaptability to change. starting from the 
perspective of international relations, the article undertakes a review of contemporary 
world political geography, pointing out some of the reasons that explain the creation, 
during the 20th century, of 150 out of a total number of 200 existing national states. 
It analyzes the ambivalent nature of some of the forces for change, not always towards 
national state weakening, and devotes special attention to the european union, the only 
example of a still unfinished construction of a post-national configuration.
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